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Why More Christians Should
Believe in Mary’s Immaculate
Conception
By Jack Mulder, Jr.
This quality of Mary’s Yes is wholly a function of the requirements of Christology…. [The
dogmatic proposition] that she “was conceived immaculate”, says nothing but what is indispensable for the boundlessness of her Yes. For anyone affected in some way by original
sin would be incapable of such a guileless openness to every disposition of God.1

Introduction
In this paper, I articulate and defend an argument for the claim that it was
important or necessary that Mary, the mother of Jesus, be conceived immaculately
in order to give her free consent to the Incarnation. Despite the unsurprising fact
that it has its roots in Catholic sources, I maintain that the argument itself does
not require the use of distinctively Catholic (as opposed to distinctively Christian)
premises. I will also simply note that, in contrast with other more foundational
doctrines, such as the doctrine of justification, in my view most non-Catholic
Christian theological traditions would not sacrifice anything essential (at least
not obviously) by admitting this element of Marian piety. I would articulate the
argument I wish to defend as follows:
1. If God were to impregnate a woman, then God would do everything necessary
to ensure that her decision in this regard would be as fully free as possible
(failing which God would be a rapist).
2. God wishes to impregnate the Virgin Mary for the salvation of the world.
3. Hence, God wishes to obtain Mary’s fully free consent to bear God’s Son.
4. The Virgin Mary’s inheritance of the scourge of original sin impedes the
exercise of her fully free consent at the Annunciation.
5. God has the power to remove this impediment.
6. Therefore, God will choose to remove the impediment to Mary’s fully free
In this paper, Jack Mulder, Jr. argues that those who hold 1) the major Christological and
Trinitarian tenets of the historic Christian faith and 2) the view that original sin and its psychological consequences are in some way inherited and not learned (which includes a wide
swath of leading figures in the historic Christian tradition) have strong reasons for why they
should also hold that the Virgin Mary never received original sin (or its psychological consequences). Mr. Mulder is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hope College.
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consent, namely, the inherited scourge of original sin.
Most of my energy in this paper will be devoted to arguing for the truth of
premise 4. Beyond that, I wish to note several things about the argument right
up front. The first thing I wish to note is that I am arguing for the Immaculate
Conception based on the character of God (in premise 1), whom Christians regard
as “perfect in holiness.”2 If Christians really wish to put God’s holiness first, then
we had better look carefully at the monumental choice God made to enter into
the human predicament, especially since this occurred through the impregnation
of a woman. Indeed, if, as some Christians (and some notable Christian institutions) hold, “Adam sinned and… by his disobedience the entire race was alienated
from God, depraved and totally lost,”3 then we should examine how the tide was
turned, starting at its very beginning.
The second thing I wish to point out about this argument is that it relies on
a view of original sin according to which the condition, whatever precisely it refers to, is inherited. Those who believe that “original sin” is simply a “brute fact”
that refers only to the universality of sin in human beings will not be persuaded
by this argument, though some more sophisticated contemporary analyses may
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.4 In general, I am using the word
“inherited” in such a way that individuals possess “inherited” traits from the very
first moment of their (pre-natal) existence, as opposed to acquiring them through
learned behaviors, including behaviors they could not have failed to learn. As I
will have occasion to note, the magisterial threads of the Protestant and Orthodox
traditions (in addition to the Catholic tradition) generally do see original sin as
something inherited, even if, as in the case of Orthodox Christians, its effects are
seen as primarily having to do with disordered inclinations we have to disobey
God. Since I claim that inherited disordered inclinations are enough to threaten
Mary’s fully free consent, I believe that the number of Christians who have strong
grounds for believing in Mary’s Immaculate Conception substantially outnumber
those who do believe it.
A third point in regard to the argument of this paper is that I assume without
argument that Jesus is God’s Son in the flesh, and that Mary is fittingly called
“Mother of God.” If one denies this, one should look outside the Catholic tradition
Hans Urs Von Balthasar, “Mary in the Church’s Doctrine and Devotion,” in Balthasar and
(then) Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Mary: The Church at the Source, trans. Adrian Walker (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 105.
2
This passage is from Bethel University’s “Affirmation of Faith.” See http://www.bethel.
edu/about/faith.
3
This quotation is from the Cornerstone University confession (http://www.cornerstone.
edu/about/identity_mission_vision/confession/), though there are many statements like
it in the literature with which similar Christian colleges and universities use to describe
themselves.
4
Consider Neil Ormerod’s description of Alfred Vanneste’s “brute fact” view on the one
hand, and Ormerod’s own discussion that follows, on the other hand (in Creation, Grace, and
Redemption [Maryknoll: Orbis, 2007], 77-84). I thank Curtis Gruenler for stimulating some
of my reflection on this topic.
1
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to someone like Lutheran theologian Robert W. Jenson who writes, “As for Mary’s
being… Mother of God, that of course is formal dogma for Catholics, Orthodox,
and magisterial Protestants alike, laid down among other places in the decrees of
Chalcedon. If one balks at that, one is simply a heretic.”5 While I have no special
interest in calling out heretics, I would simply note that calling Mary the “Mother
of God,” even if it is only taken to carry Christological meaning, should be natural
to most of the historic Christian faith, and that is all I need.
The distinguishing feature of the argument that interests me is that it finds the
necessity for Mary’s Immaculate Conception in her free consent at the Annunciation. In contrast, in this paper I am not arguing that bearing a sinless individual
or even God the Son, of itself, requires the Immaculate Conception.6 Karl Barth’s
claim that even Jesus inherited the sinful nature that the rest of us did may cause
trouble for some such arguments, but from the point of view of the argument I
intend to develop here, which nature the Son of God inherits (and for what very
precise salvific purposes) is neither here nor there.7 Rather, I am arguing that an
immaculately conceived individual makes for the best and least coerced recipient
of the invitation to bear God the Son.
There is no need here to recite the wide body of work by Christians in recent years
to reclaim aspects of the wider Christian tradition, which have included turning
from merely negative comments on the Blessed Virgin. In this environment, the
reason why Christians should be relearning to appreciate Mary is fairly obvious to
any faithful reader of the Bible, and is well stated by Timothy George, who writes,
Without forsaking any of the evangelical essentials, can we echo Elizabeth’s acclamation,
“Blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb!” (Luke 1:42), or
resonate with the Spirit-filled maid of the Magnificat: “My soul magnifies the Lord, and my
spirit rejoices in God my Savior, for he has looked on the humble estate of his servant. For
behold, from now on, all generations will call me blessed” (Luke 1:46-48)?8

To bring an end to the caveats, my goal in this paper is not to manufacture
Catholics. I merely wish to put forward an argument for why Christians should
take the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception seriously, and not simply hold
it up as a rhetorical extreme representing where retrievals of Mary need not go.
Several Catholic documents and theologians have given some version, however
brief, of the argument that concerns me,9 but despite its pedigree, the recent wave
5
Robert W. Jenson, “A Space for God,” in Mary: Mother of God, eds. Carl E. Braaten and Robert
W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 50.
6
For one version of such an argument (which I am not impugning as worthless), see John
Henry Cardinal Newman, Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, new impression
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921), 369.
7
See Church Dogmatics I/2, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1956), 152-159. I thank Andrew Peterson for bringing this point to my attention.
8
See Timothy George, “The Blessed Virgin Mary in Evangelical Perspective,” in Mary: Mother
of God, eds. Braaten and Jenson, 104.
9
The Catechism of the Catholic Church (hereafter CCC; 2nd edition, Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference 1994), paragraph 490. The most detailed form of the argument

119

Christian Scholar’s Review

120

of Protestant discussion regarding Mary has perhaps entirely failed to notice it.10
I believe that one reason for the fact that it has not been substantially discussed
in an ecumenical environment is that the argument itself is underdeveloped as
of yet and awaits a philosophically sensitive treatment. In this paper, I attempt
to put some flesh on this skeleton of an argument. The result, I hope, will be that
many Christians of an ecumenical stripe are given strong reason to believe that
the Immaculate Conception of Mary is, if not logically required, at least preeminently appropriate should God desire to become incarnate through the route of
human pregnancy.

Some Brief Historical Notes on the Doctrine and a Preliminary Objection
The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is often popularly thought of
as a stumbling block to Christian unity, since it is usually denied by Protestants
and often considered unnecessary and false by Eastern Orthodox Christians,
who do hold Mary to be free from actual sin.11 It is the Catholic understanding
of Mary and her Immaculate Conception that I want to argue for here, and in the
text in which the dogma was defined we read, “the most Blessed Virgin Mary
was, from the first moment of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege
of almighty God and in view of the merits of Christ Jesus Saviour of the human
race, preserved immune from all stain of original sin…”12 It is important to note
that in this dogma of the Catholic Church, Mary is clearly held to be redeemed by
Christ. On this point, Pope John Paul II writes, “By virtue of the richness of the
grace of the beloved Son, by reason of the redemptive merits of him who willed
to become her Son, Mary was preserved from the inheritance of original sin.”13 This
is why Mary’s redemption by Christ is sometimes called “preservative rather

(though still somewhat fragmentary) of which I am aware is given in Karl Rahner, “The
Immaculate Conception,” in Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1965), 201-213.
10
I can find no real awareness of the argument in most of the books reviewed by Rachel
Hostetter Smith in her essay, “The Trouble With Mary? Considering the Person and Place
of Mary in Christian Theology and Person Devotion – A Review Essay,” Christian Scholar’s
Review 37 (2008): 357-380. For more on the trend of retrieving thought on Mary, one might
also consider Lawrence S. Cunningham’s essay, “Some Recent Books on Mary,” Pro Ecclesia
19 (2010): 93-101, as well as the rest of the issue of Pro Ecclesia in which Cunningham’s essay appears.
11
See Timothy (Kallistos) Ware, The Orthodox Church, new edition (London: Penguin, 1997),
259-260 and 222-225. See also Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World (Crestwood,
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000), 86.
12
See J. Neuner, S. J. and Jacques Dupuis, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the
Catholic Church, 7th edition, ed. Jacques Dupuis (New York: Alba House, 2001), paragraph 709.
13
See John Paul II’s encyclical Redemptoris Mater, paragraph 10, italics original. I use the
translation in Mary: God’s Yes to Man: John Paul II’s encyclical Redemptoris Mater (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), which includes an introduction by (then) Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger
and a commentary by Hans Urs Von Balthasar.
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than consequent.”14
In the formulation of the doctrine, the idea that Mary could have never contracted the stain of original sin at all was thought by many, including St. Thomas
Aquinas, to suggest that Mary did not need redeeming by Christ, and thus to
threaten the universality of redemption by Christ.15 Accordingly, Aquinas argued
that she had been redeemed at a time between her conception and her birth,
and committed no actual sin thereafter.16 Later, especially through Duns Scotus
and the Franciscans, it was argued that redemption by Christ in the manner of
exemption from original sin was possible, and the view that it was actual in the
case of Mary was gradually adopted by the Church until it was defined in 1854
by Pope Pius IX in the passage noted earlier.17 Now there are some difficulties in
understanding just how original sin is transmitted so that it can be, in a sense,
“blocked” before reaching Mary, who would otherwise have received its stain were
it not for her anticipatory redemption.18 However, I propose to grant that such a
possibility (which is assumed in premise 5 of my argument) can be understood
adequately, and move onto the question of what reasons may exist for wanting
to affirm its actuality.19
There is a further worry that one might have about this “anticipatory redemption,” and it might go something like this: does not Mary’s being given an
anticipatory redemption nullify the very freedom from coercion that I am trying
to uphold, since her being freed from original sin may enhance her freedom from
coercion at the Annunciation, but she still had no choice about whether to be
granted this anticipatory redemption?20 In raising this worry, the pitfall we need
to avoid is conflating redemption with salvation. Although the Catholic Church
believes that its version of predestination to salvation (where either Thomist or
Molinist conceptions are seen as orthodox) is compatible with human freedom,
nothing in this paper is concerned with Mary’s predestination in itself as opposed
to simply safeguarding Mary from the initial reception of original sin, by way
of an anticipatory redemption.21 While it is true that the Catholic Church, along
14
See Anthony J. Tambasco, What Are They Saying About Mary? (New York: Paulist Press,
1984), 49.
15
See Summa Theologica, 5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1948, repr.
Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1981). This work is cited by Part, Question, and Article, and
this reference is from ST, III.27.2.
16
Ibid., articles 1 and 2.
17
For more on the history of the doctrine, see Edward Dennis O’Connor, C.S.C., ed. The
Dogma of the Immaculate Conception (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958).
18
See Marie-Joseph Nicolas, O. P., “The Meaning of the Immaculate Conception in the Perspectives of St. Thomas,” in O’Connor, ed., The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, 327-345.
19
Some forms of these difficulties will need to be confronted even by those who deny the
Immaculate Conception but affirm Jesus’ exemption from original sin, since Jesus was, of
course, the son of Mary in addition to being the Son of God.
20
This worry, or something like it, was voiced by an anonymous reviewer of this paper, to
whom I am indebted for many helpful suggestions.
21
See CCC, 488-489.
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with the Orthodox Church, holds that Mary remained free from any personal sin
throughout her life, the argument in this paper does not claim that her lifelong
freedom from personal sin is logically entailed by God’s decision that she be immaculately conceived. The fact that Mary was rescued (in an anticipatory way)
from original sin speaks to her redemption, but the fact that she enjoys salvation
can only be through her perseverance in grace to the end of her life, and this
requires freedom. For this reason, it still makes sense to honor Mary, since her
perseverance in grace was free in the requisite sense, even if her initial rescue
from ever having contracted original sin was not. In what follows, I will attempt
to provide one way of explaining why the Immaculate Conception was necessary
or at any rate, appropriate, and thus necessary given God’s aims, for Mary to give
her free consent in the Annunciation.

Freedom, Redemption, and the Nature of Coercion
In order to begin developing an argument for the most crucial premise of my
argument, which I take to be premise 4, I want first to consider a passage from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Book III, where Aristotle considers the voluntariness of human actions, he writes,
But what about actions done because of fear of greater evils…? Suppose, for instance, a
tyrant tells you to do something shameful, when he has control over your parents and
children, and if you do it, they will live, but if not, they will die. These cases raise dispute
about whether they are voluntary or involuntary. However, the same sort [of unwelcome
choice] is found in throwing cargo overboard in storms. For no one willingly throws cargo
overboard, without qualification, but anyone with any sense throws it overboard to save
himself and the others. These sorts of actions, then, are mixed.”22

Now Aristotle does not go so far as to say that actions such as throwing the
cargo overboard during a storm are wholly unfree. Instead, he claims, they are
“mixed.” Presumably this means that they are mixed with free elements (since one
could theoretically choose to keep the cargo at the expense of the crew) and coerced
elements (one is forced by the circumstances of the weather into an unpleasant
choice, whose ultimate decision is all but determined for people “with any sense”).
With this in mind, let us discuss what it might mean to be coerced. We have
a helpful model in Michael J. Murray’s essay, “Coercion and the Hiddenness
of God.”23 In that essay, Murray argues that God cannot become manifest in a
theophany in which God demands belief, because then the decision to believe
and enter into a loving relationship with God would be coerced. In his discussion
of coercion along these lines, Murray gives three factors in any coercive threat
22
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a6-13 in Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd edition, trans. Terence
Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 30.
23
Murray, “Coercion and the Hiddenness of God,” reprinted in Eleonore Stump and Michael
J. Murray, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 241-250.
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that have to do with the severity of it. The first factor is “threat strength.” Here
Murray notices the obvious fact that
The degree to which I feel compelled to do an act that I would not otherwise do (say, to give
all my money to a stranger) would be much greater if the threatener held a gun to my back
than if he threatened to call me a dirty word if I failed to comply with his wish.24

The next factor is “threat imminence.” Although there are three types of threat
imminence, we can glimpse them by way of an example. Consider the case of an
individual who contemplates smoking but is met with the threat that smoking
causes cancer. A person who considers the probability that the cigarette at hand
and any subsequent addiction will cause cancer is concerned with “probabilistic
threat imminence.” Someone who supposes that regular but moderate smoking
could cause cancer but only at a ripe old age is inclined to downplay the “temporal
imminence” of the threat. Finally, someone who has just watched a particularly
gripping advertisement intended to scare those who smoke is likely to feel that
the threat is more “epistemically imminent” for her. A final factor for Murray is
called “wantonness.” Murray claims that certain individuals may have a wanton
“feeling of indifference for one’s well-being in cases where that well-being is
threatened should there be a refusal to submit to the terms of some restriction on
one’s freedom.”25 Murray goes on to write,
While it is surely impossible to quantify these characteristics in order to define exactly what
constitutes a threat which overwhelms freedom, it can be said that the degree to which
freedom is compromised is directly proportional to threat strength and imminence and
inversely proportional to wantonness.26

Bringing this analysis to reflect on matters that pertain more traditionally to
Christian revelation, Murray writes, “the threat posed by the prospect of eternal
damnation is equal to the strongest imaginable threat.”27 Narrowing our scope
even further, let us reflect on Mary’s case. In doing so, we should keep in mind
that it scarcely appears negotiable for Christians that Mary’s consent to bear Jesus
was free. God, after all, is not a rapist, and however extraordinary her pregnancy,
it is God who is the child’s (only) father and Mary his mother, and this relationship cannot give place to coercion.28 In the Catholic tradition, Mary’s full consent
Ibid., 245.
Ibid., 246.
26
Ibid., 246-247.
27
Ibid., 247.
28
See Balthasar, “Mary in the Church’s Doctrine and Devotion,” for more on the necessity of
Mary’s virginity. I suppose some Christians now see room to doubt whether Christ’s conception was virginal. Suppose, as I do not hold, that it was not. Then I think Christians who hold
this should be willing to endorse God’s invitation to Mary to bear the Son of God through
her physical impregnation by Joseph. Such people will still need Mary’s free consent in the
way that I argue for it here. The other option, it seems to me, is for these Christians to rest
content with Mary being forced to bear or subsequently surprised to have borne the son of
God (assuming the untenability of adoptionism), while not being forced to bear or subse24
25
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is usually thought to be rendered in saying “Behold, I am the handmaid of the
Lord. May it be done to me according to your word” (Luke 1:38). Now ordinarily,
becoming pregnant absent a human father and prior to living with one’s spouse
in the context of second temple Judaism would have had little to commend it.
Of course, Mary’s case is not ordinary. She was told (Luke 1:32-33) that her son
would be Israel’s great hope and the restoration of the Davidic covenant. Such
things might make the promise on offer a bit more appealing.
Still, let us consider a hypothetical agent; call her Martha, for the moment.
Suppose that Martha is a quite ordinary human agent who is infected with the
kind of original sin that, much of traditional western Christianity would claim,
ordinary human agents are, and now suppose that Martha is confronted, in something like the Annunciation, with the prospect of becoming the mother of the Son
of God. Already it is difficult to imagine that Martha’s fallen nature could be very
depraved. For consider what would happen if Mary’s nature were as depraved
as some of the reformers held the rest of our fallen natures to be. The point of
this exercise is to see that some views of the scope and effect of original sin seem
untenable in Mary’s case right on their face. It matters not which tradition we
consult or in which order, since we already know that, as a matter of logic, some
views of “original sin” are untouched by the argument at hand. But as for those
that raise some red flags in Mary’s case, consider Luther’s view in the Heidelberg
Disputation, according to which “Free will, after the fall, exists in name only, and
as long as it does what it is able to do, it commits a mortal sin.”29 On this view,
supposing for the minute (as it is not clear that Luther would have been willing
to do) that this view applies to Mary at the Annunciation, it seems impossible that
her decision to acquiesce to her spiritual vocation would have been freely made
for the right reasons. Consider also Question and Answer 8 from The Heidelberg
Catechism in the Reformed Tradition. There, we read, “Q: But are we so corrupt
that we are totally unable to do any good and inclined toward all evil? A: Yes,
unless we are born again, by the Spirit of God.”30 On this view (again, supposing
that this must apply to Mary), unless Mary is redeemed prior to, or in the moment
of, the Annunciation, God would knowingly either impregnate a woman without
her consent or have the Son of God enter the world through an act of sin. How a
Christian could find this tenable is simply beyond me. It seems little wonder that
Luther would have held Mary in high honor, if for no other reason than that his
thought would have required it.
Returning to our hypothetical Martha, then, perhaps we suppose that she
was granted some kind of anticipatory redemption through Christ, but that this
redemption could have come at any of a number of points. Indeed, perhaps she
quently surprised to have borne the son of Joseph (as it was and will no doubt be thought).
People who are content with this will not be persuaded by the argument of this paper.
29
Thesis 13, in Selected Writings of Martin Luther, vol. 1, 1517-1520, ed. Theodore G. Tappert
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 66.
30
See Ecumenical Creeds and Reformed Confessions (Grand Rapids: CRC Publications, 1988), 15.

Why More Christians Should Believe in Mary’s Immaculate Conception

could have been granted a kind of redemption just prior to the imaginary Annunciation (or at whatever counts as a safe temporal distance from it) so that she
would be suitably free to offer her consent, if she were to choose to do so. Leaving
aside the question of how strange this makes the whole affair seem (Martha is
redeemed just in time for and just for the purpose of rendering her free consent),
we need to ask about this case’s hypothetical plausibility.
Here we have some thorny questions to confront regarding Martha’s psychology at the moment of this imaginary Annunciation. Suppose that Martha refuses.
Even if she does not have quite as robust a conception of the Christian afterlife
as we argue over in our contemporary period, the consequence of Sheol, vastly
inferior to this life, would seem almost as much of a threat as damnation. Further,
the refusal to bear the promised Messiah could easily be imagined as a serious
rebellion, and Jews would have ample testimony regarding God’s dealings with
rebels, such as Korah, whose rebellion against Moses saw the very earth open up
to swallow the rebels alive, and fire coming from heaven to consume them.31 Given
the testimony of the Torah, then, a refusal on the part of our hypothetical Martha
to bear the Messiah of Israel could be considered a rebellion whose punishment
could be temporally quite imminent.
In this context, Gabriel’s announcement to Martha amounts to this: “take
upon yourself the motherhood of Christ or you and/or all Israel will miss out
on the promised Messiah!” Martha might be left to imagine how her rebellion
would be punished. This suggests that coercion is very clearly being brought to
bear, but the case is not actually quite as clear as all that. Murray, for instance, in
an article he authored with David F. Dudrick, argues that one of the necessary
conditions involved in coercion is that “The threat is the reason for [an agent’s]
choosing [the act required].”32 On one level, this seems obvious. In our ordinary
parlance, coercion implies the loss of the will’s autonomy, and autonomy is still
present even if someone puts a gun to your head and says, “Eat this bowl of ice
cream,” provided you had already formed the intention to eat the ice cream, and
were subject to no second-guessing regarding the safety of doing so.
On another level, though, it seems to me that there are certain degrees of
coercion in light of which Murray’s and Dudrick’s requirement here is too strong.
Suppose that Sally decides to give the cash in her wallet to a man on the street (call
him Tony) who looks to be rather down on his luck. In fact, suppose that Sally
forms such an intense resolution to do so that she even considers that a threat to
her life would be evidence only of the desperation of Tony as an assailant rather
than of his vice. As Sally approaches Tony, Tony pulls a gun on Sally and exclaims,
“Your money or your life!” Now, Sally’s decision was already sufficient for her offer
to Tony of the money, and so we can grant that the threat was not the reason for
the choice to give Tony the money. However, in this situation, it seems simplistic
See Numbers 16.
Murray and Dudrick, “Are Coerced Acts Free?” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995):
112.
31
32
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to suggest that there is no coercion here at all, simply because Tony’s threat was
not the sole reason for Sally’s handing over the money. This kind of threat is jarring and it produces fear in the agent to whom it is issued. If Sally is an ordinary
agent, and let us stipulate that she is, then her frame of mind will vacillate between
the thought “I had better give this man the cash for I don’t want to die,” and the
thought, “you see, he’s desperate; this is why my prior decision should guide my
action,” and it is hard to imagine that the former does not escalate very quickly
in Sally’s consciousness. What can we say of this agent? Again, I think Murray
and Dudrick are right to think that something like this would not be objectively
or forensically real coercion, but objectively real coercion is only what you are
concerned with if you are a legislator or a judge (or a theoretical ethicist). If you
are a spouse, it is an entirely different matter.33
As those of us who have been reared in a modern western context of courtship, proposal, and marriage know, very few people upon offering marriage to a
potential spouse, seriously hope for the person to say in response, “could I have
some time to think?” We tend to think that consent, spontaneously and joyfully
rendered, is the more appropriate response, suggesting, as I think it does in many
cases, that the person given the offer had already been predisposed and happy to
render her or his consent. Now, of course, not every case is like this, and indeed,
I think in some cases, “could I have some time to think?” might be a perfectly
acceptable, mature, and reasonable response from a potential spouse.34 In such
cases, a person simply wishes to make such a momentous decision not in an instant
of emotional rapture, but in a quiet moment of solemn reflection. Here are some
questions that seem appropriate in such a context: “Do I really love so-and-so?,”
“Am I ready to pledge unconditional devotion and affection to so-and-so?,” “Am
I prepared to love and care for children that may spring from such a union?” and
so on. Here is one question that signals an inappropriate relationship: “What will
so-and-so (or my family, or so-and-so’s family) do to me if I refuse?” If the agent to
whom the proposal is given consents to the union out of worries based on the last
question, what we are dealing with is some degree of coercion. While the coercion
may not always be legally punishable, as when a parent exercises such influence
that the daughter or son does not wish to disappoint her or his parent by refusing
a longed-for match (as opposed to the coercion in cases of rape), any amount of
coercion seems to make this agent’s freedom at least “mixed” in Aristotle’s sense.
At this point, let us return to our hypothetical Martha. She is visited by an
angel who informs her that she will become pregnant by the Holy Spirit, with at
least the implicit understanding that her consent is called for. What will she do in
33
See CCC, 505, where we read, “The spousal character of the human vocation in relation to
God is fulfilled perfectly in Mary’s virginal motherhood.”
34
An anonymous reviewer noted that this response seemed perfectly acceptable, and my
position does not require me to disagree, but in the cases where such a response is compatible with the absence of any inclination to refuse, there are appropriate considerations the
potential spouse might bring to the deliberation, and considerations that are inappropriate,
about which see the main text.
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this situation? I submit that if she is not already predisposed to act in accordance
with every dictate of God’s will she will vacillate between the thought, “I had
better consent for I know how God’s wrath has been discharged with rebels in the
past,” and the thought, “Surely this is a wonderful offer from the Most High.” A
redeemed human being who freely acquiesces to the angel’s announcement will
consent for reasons similar to the second thought. A coerced individual (what
degree of coercion is not important since God would presumably hope to minimize it to the extent that is feasible) will acquiesce for reasons similar to the first
thought. At this point, someone will surely interject, “Of course, but one needn’t
have been immaculately conceived to give pride of place to the right motivation
for a choice!” On one level, of course this is the case. However, let us inquire a bit
more into Martha’s deliberation.

The Relevance of the Fall
In the Christian tradition, there has usually been an awareness that even after
baptism and entry into the Christian life, the “regenerate” person will continue to
struggle with temptations toward sin that are not adequately explained apart from
the fall. The Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it this way: “Baptism, by imparting
the life of Christ’s grace, erases original sin and turns a man back toward God,
but the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined to evil, persist in man
and summon him to spiritual battle.”35 As Leo Scheffczyk puts it, “Only thus is
concupiscence revealed as it is in the present economy of salvation. It is the rebelliousness of man under sin against his ‘supernatural’ orientation and his infinite
destiny.”36 Although the finer points regarding concupiscence are not agreed upon
by all Christians (indeed the mechanics of it are disputed among Catholics),37 the
awareness that we remain inclined toward evil because of the fall, and even after
what is often called “regeneration” is widely recognized.
Although the Reformation churches understand the term “concupiscence”
in a different way than the Catholic tradition does,38 it is worth noting that there
are clearly elements in these traditions that remain after baptism and answer in
many ways to what the Catholic tradition calls the concupiscence that remains
after baptism. Thus, for ease of reference, I will simply call this widely-agreedupon psychological proneness toward evil the having of “disordered inclinations.”
CCC, 405.
See Scheffczyk, “Concupiscence,” in Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, vol.
1 (New York: Herder, 1968), 404.
37
For an interesting survey of some of the issues, see Gustav Siewerth, trans. Adrian Walker,
“Original Sin and Concupiscence,” Communio 27 (2000): 46-57 and Michael Figura, “Concupiscence and Desire from the Point of View of Theological Anthropology,” Communio 27
(2000): 3-13.
38
A good explanation of a classical Reformed perspective on this is found in chapter 2 of
Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols., ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2007), vol. 3.
35
36
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Again taking Luther as one example among many, consider this text from his
Large Catechism:
For we must keep at it incessantly, always purging out whatever pertains to the old Adam,
so that whatever belongs to the new man may come forth. What is the old man? He is what
is born in us from Adam, irascible, spiteful, envious, unchaste, greedy, lazy, proud, yes, and
unbelieving; he is beset with all vices and by nature has nothing good in him. Now, when
we enter Christ’s kingdom, this corruption must daily decrease, so that the longer we live
the more gentle, patient, and meek we become, and the more free from greed, hatred, envy,
and pride.39

Here, it seems, we can gradually wean ourselves off of the vicious tendencies
we continue to have, even after coming into “the kingdom of Christ.” Calvin,
in discussing the “mortification of the flesh,” and the renewal that brings this
about, writes,
This renewal, indeed, is not accomplished in a moment, a day, or a year, but by uninterrupted,
sometimes even by slow, progress God abolishes the remains of carnal corruption in his
elect, cleanses them from pollution, and consecrates them as his temples, restoring all their
inclinations to real purity, so that during their whole lives they may practice repentance,
and know that death is the only termination of this warfare.40

In his commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, Zacharius Ursinus (also its principal author), writes, in regard to “sin which does not thus reign,” “Such sins are
disordered inclinations and unholy desires, a want of righteousness, and many
sins of ignorance, of omission, and of infirmity, which remain in the godly as
long as they continue in this life.”41 In the Anglican Communion, the ninth of the
thirty-nine articles reads,
Man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil,
so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born
into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth
remain, yea in them that are regenerated.42

In the Orthodox tradition, Vladimir Lossky’s widely cited The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church affirms, “sin, this parasite of nature, rooted in the will,
lives in it, makes it a prisoner of the devil, himself a prisoner of his own will frozen
forever in evil.”43 Lossky goes on to cite with approval passages from Orthodox
39
Martin Luther, The Large Catechism, 4.64, trans. Robin H. Fischer (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1959), 89.
40
Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 3.3 (one volume edition, from first volume), trans.
Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1989), 516.
41
See Ursinus, The Commentary of Zacharius Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans. G. W.
Willard (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1852), 44.
42
Article 9 in “Church of England, Thirty-Nine Articles,” in Creeds and Confessions of Faith
in the Christian Tradition, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss, vol. 2 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003), 531.
43
Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary
Press, 1976), 133.
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authorities, as in St. John Damascene: “repentance is a return, accompanied by trial
and toil, from that which is contrary to nature to that which is in accordance with
nature: a return from the devil to God,” and St. Isaac the Syrian: “until the moment
of death neither the time nor the works of repentance can ever be complete.”44
Now, neither the passage from Luther nor the 39 articles says, as Calvin, Ursinus, and Lossky at least suggest, that we will struggle with what we are calling
“disordered inclinations” throughout our whole life. Still, Calvin, Ursinus, and
Lossky suggest that the war to achieve holiness will always remain even with the
regenerate until death. This seems to be the majority view among Protestants, as
Jerry L. Walls notes. He writes,
Unlike most Protestant theologians, Wesley believed that entire sanctification is possible
in this life…. Wesley also stressed the processive dimensions of sanctification and thought
that entire sanctification could not normally be received without years of gradual growth
and progress in grace and holiness.45

Now it is not obvious whether this view of Wesley’s entails the removal of disordered inclinations in a definitive way (unless one lapses back into sin, which is
always possible) or not, but I should note that if anyone believes that such inclinations can be definitively erased in this life without remainder then that person
may not be persuaded by the argument in this paper. It is worth noting, however,
that this view seems to be a minority opinion among Christian theologians.
Let us return to Martha. We have already given reasons for why it is implausible for her to be infected with, and not redeemed from, original sin, at least
as it is understood in the West. Let us consider further whether the disordered
inclinations that result from original sin (usually in both East and West) might
also cause problems for Mary’s consent. On this point, we might consider James
Alison’s remark that
When the [Catholic] Church teaches us that Christ and the Virgin Mary were without concupiscence, having been without original sin, the content of what is being taught is that
they were both (in different ways, of course) fully active constructors of the new creation
and that the resistance that they suffered to their work of bringing about the new creation
was exterior to them, and not interior to them, as it is with us.46

44
Ibid., 204-206. Note that the fact that Orthodoxy has a lighter view of the fall than the West
does not mean that disordered inclinations are not inherited through original sin. See Ware,
The Orthodox Church, 223.
45
Jerry L. Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53.
One might object that the Catholic tradition holds a class of Christian perfection similar to
Wesley’s category. In one sense, this is true (ST, II-II.24.9), but it is not true that concupiscence
is ever totally destroyed in this life (ST, I-II.74.3). See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Christian
Perfection and Contemplation, trans. Sister M. Timothea Doyle (St. Louis: Herder, 1937), 168169), who notes that the perfect “still commit venial sins through frailty or surprise,” which
is easy to imagine in the case of the Annunciation.
46
See Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes (New York: Crossroad,
1998), 237-238.
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Now, what if our hypothetical Martha still has the “disordered inclinations” that
remain even after regeneration, according to most Christian thinkers?47 If so, then
Martha will have some semblance of a disordered inclination to heed the call of
sin. What if Martha does not give her consent to bear the Messiah? To raise this
problem with particular acuity, suppose we are “open theists” and deny comprehensive divine foreknowledge.48 Certainly God will not overtly coerce Martha.
Would an individual with disordered inclinations plausibly consent for the right
reasons? Since so much hangs on this, why would God not grant Martha (or at
least some subset of women) freedom from original sin just to increase the probability that she (or the next woman in line, or the next) would give a fully free
consent? Is God content with a free consent rendered after weighing one’s options
and contending with disordered inclinations to oppose God in this, perhaps the
most intimate cooperation between God and a human being imaginable? Note
that this case is not the case of the joyful potential spouse who just happens to be
reflective. It is rather analogous to the case of a potential spouse who works to
resolve a battle within her about whether she wishes to accept the offer of marriage. Here we should ask ourselves the simple question: if there is some way for
God to have (or even enhance the probability of having) the most willing human
being possible to bear God in the flesh, would not that be what God would want?
Indeed, even supposing that God could foreknow everything there were
to know about Martha’s choice, how is it plausible that at this momentous occasion, in addition to the fear instilled by the angel’s appearance (which would
only be rational), and the momentary confusion she might have regarding the
possibility of the thing, our Martha, due to her disordered inclinations, does not
consider with herself that she would rather not bear the Messiah? In response to
this situation, she could either persuade herself that this was the smart play, not
wishing to be subject to whatever penalties God might have in mind for refusal,
or she could simply convince herself, in spite of her inclinations, that this offer
from the Most High was to be looked upon as wonderful, and much to be preferred, even with the suggestion of scandal that it bears. Yet it seems to me that
an individual infected with disordered inclinations would have to do one of these
things, and contending with disordered inclinations to refuse, however briefly,
would make our Martha vacillate between the fear of punishment for refusal, and
the willingness to consent freely. If God foresees (the probability or actuality of)
this vacillation, is this vacillation enough hesitancy on Martha’s part for God to
act in an anticipatory way, and grant Martha freedom from original sin and its
psychological consequences?
47
The Catholic tradition privileges the claim that the Virgin Mary lacks concupiscence,
though this is not technically a dogma. See Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, ed.
James Canon Bastible, trans. Patrick Lynch, 4th edition (1955; reprint Rockford: Tan Books,
1960), 202-203.
48
Catholic teaching holds that God possesses such foreknowledge. See Ott, Fundamentals of
Catholic Dogma, 41.
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I think the answer is yes. It would be one thing if God were on the same level
of agency as Mary, and the removal of original sin and its consequences in her
resulted only in more openness to generally good things (like kind marriage proposals from worthy suitors) than might be found in other humans. But a paradox
of freedom for Christians is that, since God is a person’s blessedness, the enhancing
of freedom just is an increasing openness to God. The idea that we have perfect
liberty in morally significant settings only where there is indifference in the agent
is widely recognized as a myth. This does not, and indeed it must not, make morally significant and genuinely free choice altogether impossible. But if one were
to enhance freedom, one would hardly introduce disordered inclinations into a
person’s soul so as to distort her real preferences. Indeed, the removal of such
disordered inclinations is by definition the return to right order within a person’s
motivations. In preparation for a woman’s free decision of whether or not to have
a child with God, I believe that God would find this removal fitting in the extreme.
Now God’s majesty perhaps cannot eliminate the awe Martha would feel, but
if she is already disinclined to consent to her extraordinary vocation, then her fear
to refuse, in this surprising situation, would give rise to some vacillation, much
as in our case of Sally’s decision to give Tony her money. The vacillation would
be between the fear of reprisal for her refusal, and the willingness to consent to
God’s plan, and this suggests to me a level of coercion that God would like to do
without. While it is true that the coercion would not be intended by God, one must
remember that with disordered inclinations, the individual does not view God’s
invitation simply under the aspect of her blessedness but also as carrying with it
an awesome threat. Instead, exempt Martha from original sin and its consequences,
so that she could, with the grace of God (and her own perseverance), refrain from
sin until the moment of the Annunciation. Then, supposing she gives the consent
she will have every reason to give, she fulfills perfectly the spousal character in
relation to God. Indeed, in an ordinary encounter that leads to pregnancy the
kind of docility and delight in doing God’s will Martha would have would be
idolatry. However, in response to God, in whom we live, and move, and have
our being, it is the fullest expression of spiritual love. At this point, epistemic
confusion and doubt are understandable, precisely because someone so humbly
disposed to God’s will would need persuading, not that this was an honor, but
that the honor was to be hers.

Objections
Objection 1
The trouble with your talking this way about Mary’s agency is that Jesus
also must have free agency in the fullest measure, and yet he agonizes about his
impending death (Luke 22:39-46), whereas Mary seems docile and eager to bear
Jesus, even with the scorn it will bring her. Does not this suggest that Jesus is not
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fully free in the way that you want Mary to be, or that your requirements for her
freedom are a little too stringent?

Response
Any Christian who does not think Jesus himself inherits a fallen nature is
going to need to tell a story about how the elements Jesus is struggling with at
Gethsemane are not the disordered inclinations that result from the fall. On the
other hand, a Barthian who holds that it is precisely a sinful nature that Christ
assumes (as I do not) will have no trouble explaining why Christ is less free than
I argue Mary should be. Clearly, if Christ has the disordered inclinations that
result from the fall, it will be easy to explain why he would struggle in a way
that Mary would not (though it might be difficult for such people to explain how
Jesus managed to acquire a sinful nature not possessed by his mother, but I cannot
concern myself with this issue here).
However, to confront the objection more directly, I would say that Jesus experiences a strong anxiety about death precisely because he is so very united to
the human condition. Yet I see no reason why an agent might not have an intense
struggle that arose from purely instinctual sources and at no point willed any
aspect of the struggle (as opposed to a drug addict, who might really be of “two
minds” about two courses of action, on which note James 4:8). Jesus, let us say,
was already conscious of his infinite dignity, but his experiential awareness of
his coming death was becoming more real.49 Mary was just becoming conscious
of her unique privilege, and this was just dawning on her. The point, in any case,
is not that Mary cannot be frightened; the point is that she cannot be frightened
into action by God. Jesus in Gethsemane, plausibly, is not a candidate for being
frightened into action by God because he is God in the flesh. Through his gratuitous
love for humanity, the second person of the Trinity, in concert with the Father and
Holy Spirit, took on flesh for the redemption of the world, and in Gethsemane
struggles with the physical and emotional repercussions of awaiting a gruesome
bodily death. Jesus, as any human would, wishes to avoid this, other things being
equal. Mary is perfectly permitted to have some wistfulness about the path her
life might have taken, but not seriously to have disordered inclinations toward
choosing or having chosen a different path, all things considered. I hold that the
same is true for Jesus.

Objection 2
You have argued that the relationship that obtains between Mary as the
Mother of Christ and God’s role as Father to Christ necessitates a consent free from
49
For a helpful interpretation of Christ’s experience that does not sacrifice his divine knowledge, see St. Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Steps of Humility and Pride, in Bernard of Clairvaux:
Selected Works, trans. G. R. Evans (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 107-111
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any coercion on the part of Mary. Does your position entail that fully consensual
intercourse between fallen and/or redeemed human beings is impossible?

Response
No, it does not entail that. We have disordered inclinations and urges and
they are strong, to be sure. For one thing, it is precisely the sensual urges of human beings that are the most frequent case studies for concupiscence. So, given
the right sort of environment (such as marriage), it might be precisely the act in
question toward which the post-fall human beings would have inclinations. Although there are certainly ways in which an inclination toward something that in
itself is good can be disordered, if the two human beings have inclinations (and
volitions) toward the same thing, then it is hardly consent that is in jeopardy.
Furthermore, we need to remember the unique character of the Annunciation.
Nowhere else in the Christian story is anyone directly impregnated by God. God
needs an extraordinary sort of consent to match his extraordinary agency and offer.

Objection 3
Your invocation of the uniqueness of the situation is interesting, since it is
not clear why Mary needs to be the subject of this exceptional treatment and, say,
the prophet Jonah does not.

Response
While prophecy is certainly a special vocation, it seems to me to be quite a
different thing to bear God’s messages to the world, and to become the mother
and caretaker of the Lord in his infancy. As Thomas Howard puts it, “They all
bore witness to the Word. This woman bore the Word.”50 Thus, this paper does
place some emphasis on the difference between punishing a petulant prophet
(much as if he were a child in one’s care as well as one’s messenger) and coercing a woman to bear one’s child. Anything on the analogy of the latter suggests
that there could be a degree to which God is a rapist. I have argued that for this
reason God would eliminate coercive elements to the maximal degree feasible,
which, I have also argued, entails cleansing Mary of the scourge and psychological consequences of original sin, at least insofar as they are understood in some
major Catholic and non-Catholic Christian traditions. Jonah can rebel, but if he
does, God will persuade him of his prophetic vocation. Mary’s role in giving birth
to Christ is unparalleled with respect to the level of partnership it requires with
God, so God should cleanse her in such a unique way as to be capable of such an
unparalleled partnership.
Thomas Howard, On Being Catholic (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 181, italics original.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that plausible ideas concerning human freedom
and coercion put serious strain on those Christians who do not hold to the Virgin Mary’s Immaculate Conception. On several views of the fall and its effects,
it seems Mary will need to be redeemed in some sense prior to the Annunciation, but I have further argued that her inheritance (via original sin) of what the
Catholic tradition calls “concupiscence,” in the form of disordered inclinations to
turn against God, also threatens to undo the fullness of freedom that presumably
God would desire her to have, were God to select her to become the mother of
His Son, Jesus. There is a way out: Aquinas, one of many medieval Dominicans
who denied the Immaculate Conception, held that Mary was sanctified in the
womb and that the “fomes of sin” (concupiscence) were bound in her.51 Although
he notes that holy people can also bind the fomes in some manner, he regards
Mary’s case as in some way a singular privilege, and elsewhere makes it fairly
clear that the motions of evil concupiscence (the fomes) cannot, in the ordinary
case at least, be bound entirely in this life.52 Those who find it possible to eliminate entirely any element of disordered inclinations (and doing so is not the same
thing as eliminating the possibility of lapsing back into sin, though it does make
the latter less likely) may find the argument of this paper unpersuasive. Since, as
far as I can tell, this is a relatively small number of Christians, it seems to me that
many more should consider carefully what reasons they already have for denying
Mary’s Immaculate Conception.53

ST, III.27.3.
ST, I-II.74.3, reply to objection 2.
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